The Declaration made by the Palestinian
Introduction
This paper seeks to address the issue of whether the Palestinian Authority's recognition of the International Criminal Court's (hereinafter 'the ICC' or 'the Court') jurisdiction can have any effect for the purpose of Article 12 of the ICC Statute. 1 As is well known Article 12 of the Rome such a question must essentially rely on a teleological and functional approach to the ICC Statute.
The Relevance of a Functional Approach
Although it could make sense to consider Palestine as a state in the general and usual meaning of the word under international law, the present paper does not wish to take a position on that issue and wants to leave it unprejudiced. 4 This is largely justified by the idea that it is pointless to take a categorical stand on an issue which is formulated in a general and abstract way, and on the other hand, it seems important to address the issue only in the specific and precise context of Article 12 of the ICC Statute.
In this respect, it is important to stress that although the Court itself has to consider the scope of the above mentioned declaration, the Court will have to refrain from attempting to determine the nature of the Palestine state in the abstract; it should only answer the question of whether or not, under Article 12 of the Statute, the Palestinian declaration can produce certain legal effects (i.e. allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction). Broadly speaking, it is not for the Court to substitute itself for states in recognizing or not Palestine as a state; accordance with international law?' The Court took care to answer within the strict limits of that question: 'The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court's opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration.' 6 Likewise in this instance, the ICC is not called upon to 'recognize' the state of Palestine, but only to ensure that the conditions necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction are fulfilled.
To this end, it is necessary and sufficient for the Court to interpret the provisions of its Statute relating to jurisdiction. It is in light of these provisions that the Court must judge the admissibility of the declaration of the Palestinian government: for that purpose, and for that purpose only, it has to determine whether Palestine is a state within the meaning of Article 12(3) of the Statute, and hence whether Palestine could make the declaration specified in that provision. In other words, the idea is not for the Court to rely on a general and 'ready-made' definition of the concept of state in international law, but to adopt a functional approach allowing it to finally determine whether the Palestinian declaration fulfils the conditions set out in Article 12(3), hence enabling the Court to exercise its statutory jurisdiction.
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Such a functional approach is extremely frequent in international law. Just refer, in this regard, to the very many conventions that define the concepts they refer to 'for the purpose of this convention :::' or 'of the present treaty ::: '. 8 This has been also the approach followed by the ICJ to grasp the concept of international organization: in order to answer the question of whether the United Nations Organization has international personality ç an issue, it noted, 'is not settled by the actual terms of the Charter' ç the ICJ clarified that 'we must consider what characteristics it was intended thereby to give to the Organization'. 9 When commenting on that 'praetorian revolution' 6 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, x 51; see also x 57. 7 A functional reading of the Statute has also been recently supported by Y. Shany, supra note 4.
Professor Shany was writing in response to Y. Ronen, supra note 4, ibid., both accepting the possibility of a functional approach, whilst arriving at a different conclusion than that of the present writer. Contrary to what is implied in Ronen's article (see e.g., at 21; see also 25) 'a determination by a legal body such as the ICC ::: that a state of Palestine exists' for the purpose of Art. 12(3) is quite different than making this determination generally; the latter is a political act for which states have a full power of appreciation; a Court's determination of the effects of the Palestinian declaration is an exercise of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle (for a similar point of view, see Shany, ibid., at 338 i la personnalite¤ peut varier, en extension comme en contenu, eu e¤ gard aux ''besoins de la communaute¤ '', il n'y a pas de raison pour que le nombre des sujets ne s'accroisse pas en fonction du de¤ veloppement normatif de l'ordre juridique international, refle¤ tant lui-me" me l'extension des ne¤ cessite¤ s sociales auxquelles cette 'faim de droit' est destine¤ e a' re¤ pondre. Gra" ce a' cet avis de la Cour, des entite¤ s diverses peuvent se voir confe¤ rer une personnalite¤ sans pour autant qu'il s' agisse d'un crime de le' se-souverainete¤ .' 11 Ibid., at 111. 12 Ibid., at 112. 13 Ibid. 14 The example of Monaco is given at 111 (ibid.); one can also think of the example of Andorra, before its 1993 constitution.
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As stated by Advocate General Sir Francis Geoffrey Jacobs in the Stardust Marine case before the European Court of Justice (ECJ):
The concept of the State has to be understood in the sense most appropriate to the provisions in question and to their objectives; the Court rightly follows a functional approach, basing its interpretation on the scheme and objective of the provisions within which the concept features. 16 This functional view of the state and its subdivisions is omnipresent, for instance, in the ECJ case law relating to the direct effect of the directives:
::: it should be noted that a directive cannot be relied on against individuals, whereas it may be relied on as against a State, regardless of the capacity in which the latter is acting, that is to say, whether as employer or as public authority. The entities against which the provisions of a directive that are capable of having direct effect may be relied upon include a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals. 17 The same idea is also behind support for the principle applied by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, 'the Strasbourg Court' or 'ECtHR') in the Drozd and Janousek case. Although in that instance it admitted the preliminary objection relating to its lack of jurisdiction ratione loci, it specified that it was only because it had not received from Andorra a declaration establishing its consent to the application of the Convention on its territory; but it acknowledged that the Principality could have formulated such a declaration based on Article 5 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, 18 despite its sui generis nature that the Court stresses robustly. 19 It is noteworthy that the Strasbourg Court, guided by the concern of ensuring a broad implementation of the Convention and thereby of an improved human rights protection, as wanted by its authors, does not doubt that its jurisdiction can extend to sui generis entities such as the Principality. Similarly, an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal noted that:
Under the ICSID Convention, the Centre's jurisdiction extends only to legal disputes arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting state and a national of another Contracting State. Just as the Centre has no jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between two states, it also lacks jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between two private entities. Their main jurisdictional feature is to decide disputes between a private investor and a State. However neither the term 'national of another Contracting State' nor the term 'Contracting State' are defined in the Convention .::: Accordingly the Tribunal has to answer the following two questions: first, whether or not SODIGA is a State entity for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Centre and the competence of the Tribunal, and second, whether the actions and missions complained of by the Claimant are imputable to the State. While the first issue is one that can be decided at the jurisdictional state of these proceedings, the second issue bears on the merits of the dispute and can be finally resolved only at that state. 20 It is interesting to note that, in this case, the Tribunal sought to determine the nature of the state entity at the phase of the appreciation of its jurisdiction (and not of the merits), considering that the difficulty concerned its jurisdiction ratione personae. Therefore it handled it 'from a point of view different of that of attribution in the meaning of responsibility law, since ''State''can have a specific meaning in the context of the dispute'. 21 As has been stressed by some legal scholars, following a 'functional approach' ultimately called for by the ICJ in its 1949 Opinion in the Reparation for Injuries case, modern international law conceives the State under the form of a variable geometry shape, whose outline depends on the subject at issue, and it relegates it to the rank of general 'notion' whose interpretation depends 'on the economy and the aims of the provisions' within which it finds itself ::: . The boundaries of the concept of the State are nonetheless in movement, its 'perimeter' is not an intangible and physically marked limit. International law apprehends the State as an entity that it can itself reshape (as witnesses by the use of conventional definitions of the 'sous un angle distinct de celui de l'attribution au sens du droit de la responsabilite¤ , car 'l'Etat' peut avoir un sens particulier dans le contexte du litige' . 22 Footnote 118: 'Of which for the rest, one of the most obvious expressions is article 3 of the United Nations Charter on the basis of which original UN member states have been considered to include the federated entities of Ukraine and Belarus:::.' (Author's translation; original text: 'Dont, d' ailleurs, une des plus e¤ videntes manifestations est l'article 3 de la Charte des Nations Unies sur la base duquel ont e¤ te¤ conside¤ re¤ es comme des E ¤ tats membres originaires de l'ONU les entite¤ s fe¤ de¤ re¤ es de l'Ukraine et de la Bie¤ lorussie:::').
The Palestinian Declaration and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 987
by guest on September 27, 2010 jicj.oxfordjournals.org
Downloaded from
considered as an emanation of the State, and the latter is, in contemporary international law, increasingly understood differently depending on the norm being applied' .
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Therefore it is by taking into account the general scheme of the provisions of the Rome Statute and the object and purpose of Article 12 that the Court is called upon to give a meaning to the term 'State' within the framework of this provision.
The Validity of the Palestinian Declaration and its Effects on ICC Jurisdiction
It is for the ICC to define its jurisdiction and the limits imposed on its exercise of jurisdiction, based on its interpretation of the provisions of the Statute, in accordance with the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. This is a general principle of international dispute settlement 24 whose specific conditions of implementation by the ICC are specified in Articles 18 and 19 of the Statute. Such terms must be applied in accordance with the 'general rule of interpretation' as codified in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
In this instance, the context and the object and purpose of the Statute and of its Article 12 are of particular importance due to the 'variable geometry' 25 of the very concept of the state, which makes it difficult to keep to a single unambiguous meaning, and, therefore to an 'ordinary meaning'. In addition, the determination of the jurisdiction of international bodies (organizations and courts ç the ICC being both) is a privileged area of teleological treaty interpretation. The Comte Bernadotte case is a remarkable illustration of the use of such reasoning whereby the ICJ justifies therein the use of the United Nation's implied powers doctrine:
It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. 26 And, regarding more precisely the capacity to submit an international claim with a view to seeking compensation for damages caused to its agents, the Court noted:
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.
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Regarding more specifically the assessment of their own jurisdiction, international courts and tribunals usually opt for a teleological interpretation of the statutory provisions that support it. As noted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its founding ruling:
[J]urisdiction is not merely an ambit or sphere (better described in this case as 'competence'); it is basically ç as is visible from the Latin origin of the word itself, jurisdictio ç a legal power, hence necessarily a legitimate power, 'to state the law' (dire le droit) within this ambit, in an authoritative and final manner.:::
A narrow concept of jurisdiction may, perhaps, be warranted in a national context but not in international law. International law, because it lacks a centralized structure, does not provide for an integrated judicial system operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, where certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or vested in one of them but not the others. In international law, every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided). This is incompatible with a narrow concept of jurisdiction, which presupposes a certain division of labour. Of course, the constitutive instrument of an international tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional powers, but only to the extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize its 'judicial character', as shall be discussed later on. Such limitations cannot, however, be presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced from the concept of jurisdiction itself.
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The ICJ has faced similar issues in the Genocide and the Legality of the Use of Force cases brought before it in the framework of the Yugoslav crisis. Without entering into the meandering (and contradictions) of the Court's successive arguments in those emotionally-charged and extraordinarily politically delicate cases, one can note that, except in those cases where the Claimant itself had in fact disputed the jurisdiction of the ICJ, 30 in the end, the ICJ always retained its competence. It is quite apparent that in doing so, despite the legal 'difficulties' of which it was aware and that it constantly tried to minimize, 31 the ICJ recognized full effect to the provisions regarding its jurisdiction ç in cases involving unquestionably the most serious of international crimes: the crime of genocide.
Likewise, there cannot be any question for the ICC to go beyond the mission that the State Parties to the Rome Statute have given it, or to substitute its will to theirs, thus making itself a law maker, which it certainly is not. Nor can the problem be posed either in terms of 'extensive' or 'restrictive' interpretation of the Statute. 32 The idea is only to interpret a provision thereof in its context and in the framework of the specific issue on which the ICC might be called to pronounce itself for the purpose of determining the scope (and the limits) of its jurisdiction in the circumstances in question. 33 For that purpose, the sensible guideline appearing in the International Law Commission's Report on its final Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties should be kept in mind:
When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted. Statute (Paragraph 1) or the declaration provided for in Paragraph 3 are therefore conditional acts whose non-existence would prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. It is indeed only if this declaration is made 36 that the Court can carry out its mission (to which Paragraph 1 of Article 12 formally refers, mentioning 'the crimes specified in article 5') 37 : the judgment of persons accused of the crime of genocide, of a crime against humanity or of a war crime. This involves, to paraphrase the terms of the Preamble, crimes of such gravity that threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world, which, being of concern to the international community as a whole, must not go unpunished and whose effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.
It is also telling that according to the terms of Article 12(3), the jurisdiction of the Court is established whenever a state that can claim a territorial title, or a personal title, has agreed to its jurisdiction. 38 As a result, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction for events that took place under the jurisdiction of states that have not ratified the Statute nor made the declaration specified in Paragraph 3 of Article 12, or with regard to nationals of states that are not parties nor have formulated a declaration. 39 Consequently, mutual consent, which is a crucial condition for the jurisdiction of most international courts (including the ICJ), is not a condition for the exercise by the ICC of its jurisdiction. The possibility open to the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by Article 13(b) of the Statute, to refer to the Prosecutor 'a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed' confirms this conclusion. In this regard, the ICC can be compared to regional courts dedicated to human rights protection. The finding made, for example, 36 The question of Palestine ratifying the Statute does not arise for now, but it is not forbidden to think that it might appear in the future, would Palestine decide to become a Party in accordance with Art. 125 ICCSt. 37 Art. 5(1): 'The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: 41 This puts into perspective the importance not that a consent be given by the holder of a territorial or personal title, but that of the legal qualification of the entity providing this consent: whether it is a state, as believed by a majority of the existing states in the world, 42 ç or not ç as considered by a minority of other countries, the fact is that only the Palestinian authority possesses, under international law, an exclusive territorial title over the Palestinian territory and the population established therein.
Besides, it is indeed in its capacity as territorial sovereign that Palestine made the declaration under Article 12 (3) The territories situated between the Green Line ::: and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied by Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and Jordan. Under customary international law, these were therefore occupied territories in which Israel had the status of occupying Power. Subsequent events in these territories ::: have done nothing to alter this situation. All these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power. 44 This paper is not an appropriate framework for assessing all the consequences of this hard to challenge position. It suffices to note that: territory by the opponent before peace is re-established, it is certain that such occupation alone does not cause the sovereignty to be transferred'. 45 (ii) Conversely, the de facto annexation of Palestinian territories infringes territorial sovereignty and the rights of the Palestinians to selfdetermination. 46 And it is untenable to consider the Oslo-Washington Interim Agreement as a renunciation from their part to the right to self-determination: not only is this right imprescriptible, but also It is additionally noteworthy that, in its 2004 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stressed that section III of the Regulation appended to the 1907 Hague Regulations that 'concerns ''Military authority over the territory of the hostile State'', is particularly pertinent in the present case'. 57 In doing so, the ICJ clearly considers that the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention 'is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories'. 58 The same reasoning can be transposed, mutatis mutandis, to this instance: But it is more than doubtful that bilateral agreements prevail over the ICC's jurisdiction such as specified in its Statute. This is the short answer (on this difficult issue a detailed discussion of which would exceed the scope of this paper) to the interesting discussion in Ronen, supra note 4, 18^20 and Shany, supra note 4, 339^342). 57 Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 44, at 171, x 89 (emphasis added). 58 Ibid., at 177, x 101. 59 See supra, at 988. purposes which are the raison d'e" tre of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. 69 As the ICJ found in the same Advisory Opinion (and as is true in the present case):
The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention [here the Rome Statute] imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly [here the State Parties Conference] and of the States which adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation should produce such a result. 
